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TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM AND SOCIAL
CONTROL -

AFTER-BORN CHILDREN

By SAUL TOUSTER*
PART I: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION

The supremacy of the legislature has become such an accepted fact in the
area of private law that it is not uncommon to find the courts expressly acknowledging the fact, even where the legislature has been silent, by advising litigants,
despite the justice of their cause, to seek their remedy from the legislature.
And where the creative judicial instincts cannot so easily be repressed, nor find
outlet in the mere volume of judicial business, they are often forced to express
themselves in terms of statutory construction-a fiction whereby the court
gets down to the real work of weighing policy and reflecting social values but
does so in the name of the legislature. As we all know, the putative father is
not always the real one.
In a field of law such as that of inheritance, where the social policies involved have been relatively stable, being founded as they are mainly upon
the family structure, which is slow to change in any society, we often find the
legislature setting down rather broad rules and leaving to the courts their application without great concern over possible "judicial legislation". This may be
merely the traditional role of the courts in the private law fields, to handle
the infinite number of complex and often unforeseeable fact situations. But
there seem to be other elements as well at play here. The often conflicting
values which go into a system of inheritance appear to be unstated, or subsumed, and it is thought better that they resolve themselves, however laboriously,
in case law rather than in the legislative halls. This seems true especially where
these values involve many unconscious forces which cannot be too accurately,
or publicly, stated, as they do in the family area but may not in others. It may
be that society would prefer to allow broad and relatively dark areas in which
courts may browse and consider what are acknowledgedly extra-legal factors
in rendering justice for the "deserving" or "undeserving" litigants.1 In addi*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, School of Law. The author
was a consultant to the New York Law Revision Commission on a topic embracing

material dealt with in this article and as such wrote a study for the Commission
which will be published in New York Legislative Document (1957) No. 65 (D)
and in the 1957 Report, Recommendations and Studies of the Law Revision
Commission. This article is written independently of that study and should not
be taken to reflect or represent in any way the views of the Law Revision
Commission.
1. An example of this may be found in cases dealing with testamentary
capacity, where the courts place a high value-though at times unconsciouslyupon how deserving are the objects of testator's bounty under the will, or under
intestacy. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L. J. 271 (1944).
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tion, the broad lines may be required by the fact that the law in this area must
be arbitrary in some degree-such as the percentages of distribution in intestacy
-but it cannot be acknowledged to be so, for society so depends on the stability
and certainty of these arbitrary standards that it comes to think of them as
"natural" and invested with an almost magical necessity. Most likely all of
these elements come into play and continue to do so within the basic system
of inheritance until significant changes occur in the source area of the law
-the structure of the family and society's attitudes toward it-at which time
the problem again becomes a legislative one and the policies and values
must be exhumed, articulated, weighed and contested until a new solution
is arrived at consonant with the new facts of family life. But until such time
as a new legislative solution is arrived at, the courts will be forced to struggle
with facts which, because of the changed social situation, take on a new color
and cannot be adequately resolved in terms of the old solution.
Such a judicial struggle recently took place in the Court of Appeals of
New York in Matter of Shapack.2 In 1930 New York abolished dower and
curtesy and substituted therefor a right of election whereby the iurviving spouse
could take an intestate share of the estate, up to one-half, against the provisions of the will. The main objects of this legislation appear to have been
(i) the removal of restraints on realty to give it the liquidity and ease of
disposition characteristic of personality, and (ii) to afford some protection
to a surviving spouse against disinheritance. 3 In the Shupack case, the testator
left almost his entire estate in the form of stock in wholly-owned corporations
to be divided, in trust, one-third for his wife for life with remainder to his
children, and one-third each for two children until they reached majority at
which time each child was to receive the principal. Under the statute 4 the
widow could not elect against the will "where the will contains . . . a provision for a trust for [her] for life of a principal equal to or more than ... her
intestate share." Although the trust of one-third was equal to her intestate share,
she claimed the right to elect on the ground that, as a holder of a minority
interest in the closed corporations, the trust for her life was illusory-since,
being at the mercy of the majority for the declaration of dividends, she had
no assurance of any income at all during her lifetime. The Court, by a five to
two vote, denied her daim, on the ground that the testator had "fully complied with the demands of the statute" in setting up the trust and that the
widow cound not complain of the "character of the property left." The minority supported the widow, feeling that the statute was "remedial" and "viewed
2. 1 N. Y. 2d 482, 136 N. E. 2d 513 (1956).

3. For the background and steps taken to effectuate the new statutory

scheme, see COMBINED REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE COMMISSION (1933).
4. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §18(d); under the provisions of §83 for

distribution in intestacy, a surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the decedent's estate where he has left children or their representatives surviving.
5.

I N. Y. 2d at 487, 488, 136 N. E. 2d at 515, 516.
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in that light, the 'trust', as used in [the statute], must be deemed to refer to
one which is substantially beneficial to such spouse . . . [I]n order to effect
the purpose of providing support of the surviving spouse for life, it must constitute the substantial equivalent of such spouse's intestate share." Although the
court's disagreement expresses itself in the form of statutory construction, the
majority looking to the literal language and the minority to what it considered
the purpose behind it, the problem should perhaps be considered more in terms
of the judiciary versus the legislature rather than strict versus broad constructionist. The majority cannot be said to be ignorant of the policies behind the
statute, but it seems to feel that these policies are not too clearly expressed
in what now appears as only a tentative solution to broader problems of family
relationships. One can almost hear the majority asking: If we go into one policy,
that of support of a surviving spouse, are we merely to weigh this against the
policy of testamentary freedom which here expresses itself in the right of a
testator to leave the kind of property he wants to? If so, what of all the other
"legislative" issues that are relevant here? If support is the critical element,
may we consider whether the spouse was in fact dependent on the testator?
Whether he did not leave her adequately provided for outside the will, by
insurance perhaps? Whether she was the mother of the surviving children so
that her support could be considered as favorable to the family unit? The
minority, by taking one of many policies behind the statute, may be said to
distort it, and certainly to close its eyes to what would be logically relevant
material. 7 One senses that -the majority felt that it could not evaluate social
policy on what was really a legislative level and so would stick to the language
of the statute, rather literally, within the old solution of testamentary freedom.

An evaluation on a legislative level, in the hopes of coming to some new
solution, would have to ask some general questions and answer them by inquiry into how far social changes have affected the values which have, up to
now, been subsumed in our inheritance laws. Taking the questions outside the
rhetoric of testamentary freedom, they might be stated generally as: Shall a
6. Id., at 491, 136 N. E. 2d at 518. For a comment on some other features
of this case, see Comment, The Widow's Share Evaluated, elsewhere in this issue,
infra.
7. The statute involves many other elements beside the surviving spouse's
dependence upon the deceased; there is the notion that the wife contributes to
the family wealth by her services in the home which frees the husband to pursue
wealth-accumulating activities; that the spouse represents the surviving head of
the family and that by providing for the spouse, children are thereby protected;
that the wife's share is a return to her of property she or her family contributed
to the marriage by gift or dowry. The final argument against the support factor
as being the dominant one, is that husbands were given rights under the statute
equal to wives. For interesting discussions of such theories relating to inheritance,
see Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance,85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936), RHEINSTrIN,
THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 57-74 (2d ed. 1955) and MECHEM & ATKINSON,
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, Introduction (4th ed. 1954).
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testator's relatives be protected after his death, or only those dependent upon
him? If so, for how long, and in what manner? And these questions would
have to be weighed in the light of the social changes which have forced the
questions upon us anew: Changes in the family itself-divorces, multiple marriages, longer life expectancy, the breaking up of the multi-generational household;8 changes in the forms freely available to provide for a family after death
-insurance, pension rights, intervivos truts, bonds or bank deposits payable on
death;9 changes in the social attitudes toward and the guarantees against dependents being left destitude-social security and other welfare legislation;
and changes in taxes, with which death has long been allied. Thus we might
say that the court in the Shupack case, although willing to do the hard work
of weighing policy and reflecting social values where the broad lines laid
down by the legislature are generally consonant with social realities, declines
to do so where new elements (which are not even subsumed in the old solution) enter the situation.
The old solution which served the common law for about 250 years in
the field of inheritance might be described as follows: a man is generally
free to dispose of his property on death as he sees fit, without regard to the
family obligations he had while alive, by executing a document called a will
according to a prescribed ritual; if he does not execute such a document, his
property will be divided in various mathematical proportions (which society
feels are roughly fair) among his closest relatives, without regard to their
situations of dependence or merit, as they relate to each other or the deceased.
Although this solution may indicate in its statement a disregard of family
dependency as a value, this value is on the contrary subsumed in the solution
and may be thought of as its foundation. For it is only where society can rely
without second thought upon the natural inclinations and motivations of a man
to acquit himself of his family duties, that it feels free to let him dispose of
his property as he wishes. Where, however, these natural inclinations have
weakened, mainly because other institutions have replaced the family in fulfilling various needs, then society has to take a more direct role in controlling
testamentary dispositions. And when it does, what was previously subsumed
will be articulated, as there is a search for a new solution. In this search there
8. See, e.g., Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing
Heir," 20 IowA L. REv. 202 (1935), where the author points out the reduced social
value placed upon collaterals in the modern American family. Guest, in Family
Provision and the Legitima Portio, 73 L. Q. Rsv. 74, 80 (1957), observes that ties
of the "kinship group," including collaterals, have similarly loosened in England
but continue with great strength in France.
9. The policies in favor of recognizing the common use of such dispositions
on death are often strong enough to lead the legislature to exempt them from
the requirements of the statute of wills even where they are testamentary In

character. See, e. g., N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §24a, exempting transfers
under pension, retirement, death benefit, stock-bonus and profit-sharing plans. For
policy discussion, see N. Y. LAW REVIsIoN COMMISSION REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND STUDIES 163-185 (1952).

254
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is a need to find out how the old solution worked when confronted with
"unnatural" situations, testators who did not do what was expected of them;
how, in short, the system of testamentary freedom fared where there was an
acknowledged need to control it in the interests of carrying out socially accepted duties.
This article directs itself to an inquiry into such an area: the statutory
protection from inadvertent disinheritance afforded children born after a parent
has made a will. Although on its face, this appears as a limitation on testamentary freedom, it may be construed--as will appear later-as a technique
for reinforcing or preserving testamentary freedom by curing a disposition:
based upon a mistake as to family situation: and carrying out a more probable
intention than appears in the will. The problem of the Shapack case may be
stated in terms of testamentary freedom versus family duty but, as was above
indicated, these are only two of a number of values which come into play when
the property and family relations between spouses are in issue.10 To the extent
that the after-born child statutes afford .protection most often to minor children
who are dependent on the testator, however, the dichotomy of testamentary
freedom versus family duty becomes more sharply expressed and illuminated in
the judicial construction of this legislation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before proceeding with the analysis it would be helpful to see the historical
background to the old solution of testamentary freedom. Since the development
of law in the American colonies was contemporaneous with the freeing of
the common law from medieval restraints in England, and because of the special
frontier conditions in the colonies-the absence of a feudal tradition, the free
availability of land, the productivity of land being determined more by owner
use than tenant use-the American laws of inheritance might be thought of
somewhat misleadingly as bursting forth unencumbered and free. 1 . So much so
it would seem, that American courts have thought of testamentary freedom not
only as a natural almost political right, but a natural condition of all law as
well.12 But, of course, this era of testamentary freedom that characterized the
common law, in England as well as the United States, is of relatively late
origin, representing a small part of the sweep of the Common Law over the
centuries of its growth, and in a larger context appears as an institution peculiar
to Western civilization.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. For a detailed description of the impact of colonial conditions on the
development of one part of the law in this area, see Andrews, The Influence of

Colonial Conditions as Illustrated in the Connecticut Intestacy Law, I SELEcT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 431 (1907).

12. Professor Hurst in his recent LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) describes the American idea of pro-

perty as being developed in terms of political rights. (pp. 8 et seq.)
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Although feoffments to uses were commonly employed to evade the feudal
limitation upon testamentary devises, it was not until 1540, only five years after
this technique was abolished by the Statute of Uses, that the landed gentry won
the right to free testamentary disposition of land. And this right was limited
to the extent of widow's dower, which was not abolished in England until 1833,
and which has continued for a longer time in many American jurisdictions.
As to personalty, there is a similar development: under administration of the
ecclesiastical courts, the widow and children had an absolute right to a share
in the testator's estate, similar to the legitim of the Civil Law, which could not
be destroyed by will; and although this right tended to disappear by the sixteenth century it held on in such important places as York until 1692, Wales
until 1696 and London until 1724, and was maintained as local custom in a
few places until the middle of the nineteenth century.' 3 Still, in general, it
can be said, that in the modern era the development had been toward complete
testamentary freedom in the countries of the Common Law while the system
of forced shares continued in Civil Law countries to the present day. How
account for this? It cannot be explained as some would like by the notion that
it was part of the Anglo-American development of democratic institutions; for
testamentary freedom has not appeared as a necessary, nor under all conditions
a desirable, feature of a democratic society. Although Locke might have considered this freedom an inherent part of the right of ownership, the French
liberals and revolutionaries attacked it (especially as it created entails) as
conducive to aristocratic license and despotism, and used a strict system of
forced heirship after the Revolution to assure a more equal distribution of estates among children. 4 And, of course, the continuation of a Civil Law scheme
in Scotland and Louisiana has not inhibited democracy. One might formally
ascribe the special development in England to the general ascendancy from the
sixteenth century of the Common Law over Civil Law influences, 15 but one
would still wonder why the Common Law retained some Civil Law ideas of
equal distribution, such as the theory of advancements and hotchpot, 16 and not
others. Probably the most persuasive reasons advanced are based on the re,spective economic developments of England and the Continent. Professor
Rheinstein approaches it from the rather formal view of the requirements of
probate in a system of forced heirship:
"Most probably the rights of 'legitim' became unpopular in consequence of the English overseas expansion which began to take place
13. For the foregoing historical development, see ATKIN SoN, WILLS Ch. 1 (2d
ed., 1953); Guest, op. cit. supra, note 8; and Cahn, op. cit. supra., note 7.

14. McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon,
1
14 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1919); RHEINSTEIN, op. cit. supra,note 7 at p. 29.
15. See Maitland, English. Law and the Rennaisance, I SELECr ESSAYS IN

ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 168 (1907).
16. See Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty and Law Merchant, id. at 212.
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at the same period. The settlement of a decedent's estate could be
seriously delayed when it became necessary to communicate, without
regular mails, fast ships, telegraph or radio, with a son who had gone
overseas and the mere establishment
of whose whereabouts might take
7
months or years of inquiry."'
Max Weber, the great German sociologist, was probably more correct when
he ascribed the Common Law tendency to more basic economic and social
factors that combined in England-the country had an expanding commercial
8
economy and was ruled by a landed gentry.In any event, the development of testamentary freedom was so powerful,
and so obscured alternative approaches, that Kent at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when adverting to the duty of a parent to provide for the
future welfare of his children, recalled that "this duty is not susceptible of
municipal regulations ...A father may, at his death, devise all his estate to
strangers, and leave his children upon the parish; and the public can have
no remedy by way of indemnity against his executor. 'I am surprised,' said
Lord Alvaney, 'that this should be the law of any country, but I am afraid
it is the law of England.'"'1
Although colonial conditions tended to sustain the principle of testamentary freedom, the impulses toward social equality and justice-perhaps, as
among French democrats-tended toward a limitation upon that freedom. It
17. Op. cit. supra, note 7, pp. 59-60.

18. "Complete, or nearly complete, liberty of testation, is only recorded
twice: as to Republican Rome and as to English law; in both cases for expanding
nations ruled by a landed gentry. Today the most important territory recognizing
liberty of testation is the territory of greatest economic opportunities: the United
States." Quoted in Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (1937). See
also HURST, supra, note 12, who develops a similar idea as to the United States
in Chapter 1, The Release of Endrgy.
19. II COMMENTARIES *203 (12th ed. 1861). Although there was some question

as to whether a parent was at early common law responsible for the support of
his minor children (see, TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DoaEsTIc RELATIONS, §§114-115
(1896)), in all modern jurisdictions this obligation has been imposed by statute.
However, in all states today, except Maine, this obligation dies with the parent,
so that his estate cannot be held to pay for the support of minor dependent

children. See Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926)

for case in point; see also Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize his Help-

less Dependents, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 559 (1928) for severe criticism of this development. Even where the parent leaves a dependent child so destitute that it requires public assistance, in New York State the parent or his estate is liable
to reimburse the state welfare agency only for assistance given during the life
of the parent, that is, during the period the law conceives of his obligation as
being in force. N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAV §§101, 104. Although the law may abhor
the disinheritance of children, it must be added that it seems to cherish the right
to do so. One area where the law's policy against disinheritance-if it can be
called a policy-may be effective is in the broad construction of class gifts so as
to include as many children as reasonably possible and so prevent disinheritance.
See, Cooley, What Constitutes a Gift to a Class, 49 HARv. L. REV. 903 (1936) and
Casner, Class Gifts to Others than "Heirs" or "Next of Kin"--Increase in the
Class Membership, 53 HARV. L. REV. 207 (1939).
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might be said that freedom impulses and equality impulses were in conflict
especially where the social need for protection seemed most demanding, that
is for dependent children. A resolution to the conflict came in some measure
in statutes designed to protect children born after a will from inadvertent disinheritance, the testator remaining free to do so intentionally. 20 The history of
these statutes and their sources in social conscience is exemplified by the class
of children they sought to protect.2 l The first statutes protected only posthumous children whom the testator could not always be expected to provide for and who, being infants, needed the most social protection. The
'next statutes protected children who were born after the testator made his
will, where he had no children living at the time, it being thought that under
such circumstances disinheritance was likely the result of the testator's failure
at the time he made his will to contemplate the possibility of having future
children. After that it was a short jump to protecting all children born after
a will was made, whether or not testator had living children when he made
his will.22 Despite the social impulses that went into this limited invasion
of testator's freedom, the statutes were rationalized in terms of carrying out
the testator's presumed intent, or curing a mistake on which his intent was
based, and so to lead the lawmakers to conclude that it was no invasion at all.
20. Daggett in Two CENTURIES' GROWTH OF AAIERICAN LAW (1901) writes:

"These statutory provisions for the protection of children are a logical outgrowth
of the abolition of primogeniture in America." (p. 188) Perhaps, it would have
been more exact to say that these statutes are a product of the same equality
tendencies which led to the abolition of primogeniture.

21. For this history, and an excellent review of all these statutes, see
Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 CoLUM. L. REV. 748
(1929). See also Dainow, Inheritanceby Pretermitted Children, 32 ILL. L. REV. 1
(1937). In England, a condition of almost complete testamentary freedom continued until the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938 which allowed the
court to make provision for certain dependent relatives of the testator, a system which has been established in a number of the Commonwealth countries.
For an excellent review of this approach, see Laufer, Flexible Restraints on
Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 277 (1955).
22. Many states have since extended their statutes to protect, as well, children
living at the time the will was made, adding to its terms language such as, "If It
appears the omission was occasioned by accident or mistake," or, "unless it appears
the omission was intentional." (See CALIF. PROBATE CODE §90 for use of the latter
type language, and MIcH. STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (83) (1943) for the former). The
theory of these statutes is that the omission results from a mistake rather than,
as in the after-born statutes, a failure to contemplate the possibility of future
children. See Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. Rv. at 174-177 (1929).
In general these statutes provide, by their terms, methods of avoidance-that
is, of rebutting a presumption of inadvertence or of showing the omission was
intentional-similar to those provided in the after-born child statutes. In general,
they operate pretty much the way after-born child statutes operate, results depending more on whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove testator's Intent than on the particular language of the statute. But cf. Mathews, op. cit.
supra, note 21, at 752, where it is suggested that the language of the statute,
"unless it appears the omission was intentional", shifts the burden of proving
the accidental nature of the omission on the child. However, a number of states
avoid this problem by requiring the determination of Intent be based on the will
alone. (E. g., California Probate Code, supra).
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The statutes did not assure children of any particular share of a parent's estate,
as the legitim of the Civil Law did; 23 nor did they prevent the disinheritance
of children who might.thereby become public charges. They were designed, it
was said, merely to cure testamentary oversights and to allow pretermitted children to take their intestate shares of a parent's estate only when the circumstances
were such that a legislative inference could be drawn that a child was left un-,
provided for only through inadvertence.
THE NEW YORK STATUTE

The New York statute, based on earlier Virginia statutes, was enacted in
1830 to make "a just provision . . . for a probable oversight" by a testator
while avoiding the consequences of an entire revocation of the will based
on changed circumstances.2 4 Although there was at the time some doubt as to
what circumstances occurring after the will would at Common Law work an
implied revocation, the revisers accepted the view that only a subsequent marriage and birth of issue together so revoked a will.25 To the extent that the
statute provided, in effect, a partial revocation of a will by the mere subsequent
birth of issue, it might be considered in derogation of Common Law, but this
does not seem to be the sense of the revisers, whose approach was that "some
legislative declaration seems expedient" on what was considered somewhat of an
open question. Indeed, no court in New York construing the statute has limited
its scope on the ground it was in derogation of Common Law; for even without
the historical doubt, this canon of construction could easily have been countered
by the, at times, equally superficial canon that a remedial statute, which this was,
should be broadly construed. As will appear in the later discussion, the courts
have worked less with formal canons of construction and more in a context of
values giving testamentary freedom a dominant place, while trying to contain
its social misuse in select cases. The statute, in almost the exact language of the
original enactment, now section 26.of the Decedent Estate Law, reads as follows:
"Whenever a testator shall have a child born after the making
of a last will, either in the lifetime or after the death of such testator,
and shall die leaving such child, so after-born, unprovided for by any
settlement, and neither provided for, nor in any way mentioned in
such will, every such child shall succeed to the same portion of such
23. For a general comparison of the Civil Law and Common Law approaches to inheritance and testation, see, BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND
COM[MON LAW (1936).
24. See REVISER'S REPORT & NoTEs, Appendix to REv. STAT. OF N. Y. (1836);

Reviser's note of 1828 to original §56, later enacted as §49, REV.

STAT.,

Part II,

c. VI, Title I.
25. See discussion of this point and resolution of doubts by Kent in Brush v.
Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 506 (1820). The revisers provided a separate statute
for revocation of the will when there was a subsequent marriage and birth of
issue. REV. STAT. §43, Part II, c. VI, Title I (1830), which later became §35 of

the N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW.
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parent's real and personal estate, as would have descended or been
distributed to such child, if such parent had died intestate, and shall be
entitled to recover the same portion from the devisees and legatees,
in proportion'26to and out of the parts devised and bequeathed to them
by such will.
The courts, in construing the statute, were very quick to disavow-for the
legislature-any intent to control testamentary freedom, recognizing as they did
the difference between the Civil Law approach and that of the statute whose object was "not to secure equality of ditribution, but to guard against unintentional disinheritance. '2 7 This is clearly expressed by the Court of Appeals in McLean
v.McLean in language which has become authoritative:
"The fundamental object of the statute, which has been quoted is
to guard and provivde against such testamentary thoughtlessness and
lack of vision as prevent a testator from contemplating the possibility
of after-born children and taking such possibility into account in framing a scheme for the testamentary disposition of his property. For reasons which at once commend themselves to our sense of justice it has
been determined, and by statute provided, that if a testator does thus
overlook and fail to consider the possibility and claims of those who,
if born, will be the natural objects of his bounty, the law will provide
for them in the distribution of his estate outside of the terms of his
will. But, on the other hand, it has never been held or assumed, in this
state at least, that it was the intention of the legislature by this statute
to compel, regulate or control testamentary provision even by a parent
for children, provided that in the disposition of his property he looked
into the future and foresaw and took into account its possibilities in the
way of after-born children and the only proof necessary or permitted
to establish sufficient testamentary conception in any case is the requirement
in the alternative of mention or provision which has been
28
quoted."

As Professor Mathews expressed it, the Civil Law approach prevents disinheritance as violative of "a social duty to provide for the family, in particular, for issue", while the American legislatures seek "to protect the disinherited
26. The Statute's history is brief. It was enacted in 1830 (REv. STAT., supra,
note 24) as applying only to a father's will; after the privilege of making a will
was granted to married women by L. 1867, c. 782, the text of the re-enacted
statute (L. 1869, c. 22) refers to "parent" instead of "father". By L. 1955, c. 255,
a new paragraph was added to the section, as follows:
"The right of a child born after the making of a last will shall be
subject to a valid power of sale expressed in the will of the testator

or implied therein pursuant to the provisions of section thirteen of
this chapter."
This addition is noted in 22 BROOKLYN L. REV. 143 (1956) and 24 FORPHAm L. REV.
502 (1955).
27. Wormser v. Croce, 120 App. Div. 287, 289, 104 N. Y. Supp. 1090 (1st
Dep't 1907).
28. 207 N. Y. 365, 371, 101 N. E. 178, 179 (1913).
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children only so far as they deem it consistent with the presumed intent of the
2
testator." 9
Although the statute is based upon a presumption of the testator's intent,
it does not open the door to a general inquiry into his actual state of mind with
respect to the after-born children3" or allow inferences to be made from the dispositive scheme expressed in his will. The statute establishes a presumption, in
the name of testator's intention, in order to protect the after-born children; and
at the same time it sets down those methods by which the presumption may be
rebutted: by provision or mention in the will, or provision by settlement. These
methods are viewed by the courts as exclusive. In the language of the McLean
case, only proof as to these matters are "permitted to establish sufficient testamentary conception" as to the possibility of having after-born children to avoid
the statute's operation. This is true even in the face of an express finding, based
on extrinsic evidence, that the testator intended to disinherit the after-born
child. Although the statutory methods of avoidance are expressed in terms of
"provision" for the child, the courts have construed this to mean not a provision which will in fact be enjoyed by the child, or used for its support, but only
such provision as will rebut the idea that testator omitted the child through
oversight.
The main questions which have come before the courts under the statute,
and which in their handling have reflected the conflicting values above discussed, are: (1) What "children" come within the protection of the statute?
(2) What constitutes a "mention" or provision in a will that avoids the operation of the statute? (3) What constitutes a provision by way of "settlement"
outside the will which avoids the statute?
1. Children within the scope of the statute
Since the first concern of the legislature was with protecting posthumous
children whom a testator was likely to leave unprovided for, the statute expressly includes them within its protection by speaking of "a child born after the
making of a last will, either in the lifetime or after the death of such testator."
29.

Op. cit. supra,note 21, at p. 748-749.-

30. Although the admission of parol evidence bearing on testamentary intent

under these statutes has been favored (e.g., Evans, Should Pretermitted Issue
Inherit?, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 269 (1943)), it is probably sounder practice to

exclude such evidence for all the reasons that it is excluded in the construction of
wills generally. A glance at the cases admitting parol evidence and searching for
a specific intent, outside the terms of the will or the limited family situation,
will show the uncertainty, confusion and contrariness of the decisions rendered.
See Annots., 65 A.L.R. 472 (1930), 127 A.L.R. 750 (1940), 152 A.L.R. 727 (1944).
As indicated infra, the author favors giving consideration only to the basic family

situation and the language and dispositive plan in the will, in applying the
statute.
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But it should be noted that their protection is no more than that of a child born
during a testator's lifetime, and is subject to the same conditions."'
Although some states have expressly included adopted children in their
statutes, the New York statute speaks only of a child born to the testator, thus
raising a question of construction as to whether or not adopted children come
within the statute's scope. In Bourne v. Dorney32 the question was answered in
the affirmative, the court holding that an after-adopted child had the same rights
as an after-born child under the statute, by virtue of the adoption provisions of
the Domestic Relations Law which declared that
"[T]he foster parent or parents and the person adopted sustains
toward each other the legal relations of parent and child, and have all
the rights and are subject to all the duties
of that relation, including
33
the right of inheritance from each other."
The court argued that since the statute established the relationship and obligations of parenthood, the right under Section 26 was within "the entirety of
rights that go with the obligation." And this decision was, the court concluded
in overruling an earlier case, 34 part of "the current of judicial thought" which
was tending toward "the assimilation of the adopted child to a child of the
35
blood."
Another question of statutory construction which has arisen relates to the
status of illegitimate children under Section 26. In Bunc v. Bunce,36 a testatrix died leaving an after-born illegitimate child who asserted her rights under
the statute. The court held that under the statute allowing an illegitimate child
to inherit from its mother "as if such child were legitimate", 37 the illegitimate
child came within the provisions of Section 26 and could take the share she
would have received if her parent-the mother--"had died intestate". When,
however, the claim of the after-born illegitimate child was made against the will
31. The statute was invoked successfully by posthumous children in Stachelberg v. Stachelberg, 124 App. Div. 232, 108 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dep't 1908), aff'd,
192 N. Y. 576, 85 N. E. 1116 (1908) )and Matter of Yates, 144 Misc. 409, 259
N. Y. Supp. 131 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aff'cd mem., 239 App. Div. 878, 265 N. Y. Supp.
976 (4th Dep't 1933). As to whether a posthumous child is considered mentioned
in the testator's will by references to "surviving issue," see infra, note 58.
32. 184 App. Div. 476, 171 N. Y. Supp. 264 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd 227 N. Y.
641, 126 N. E. 901 (1919).
33. Formerly §114 of the N. Y. DoMESTIC RELATIONS LAW; now §115, with
some other minor changes in language.
34. Matter of Gregory, 15 Misc. 407, 37 N. Y. Supp. 925 (Surr. Ct. 1896).
35. In general the approach of the New York courts has been the same as
that of other states with statutes which do not expressly include adopted children.
See Annot., "Adopted child as within contemplation of statute regarding rights
of children pretermitted by will," 105 A.L.R. 1176 (1936).
36. 27 Abb. N. Cas. 61, 14 N. Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
37. L. 1855, c. 547, predecessor to §83 (13) of the N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW.
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of the father, it was held that the child had no rights under Section 26 since it
could not inherit from the father, were the father to die intestate.38 Thus the
courts followed a principal that the illegitimate child has rights under Section
26 against a parent it could inherit from in case of intestacy.39
The only New York case dealing with the question of whether the grandchildren of the testator come within the statute concerns the children of an afterborn child who predeceased the testator. In Matter of Horst,40 the testator had
made his will before he had any children; thereafter he had three children one
of whom predeceased him leaving children surviving. None of the testator's three
children were mentioned or provided for by him, and although it was clear that
his two surviving children could take under Section 26, a question was raised
as to whether testator's grandchildren, the children of the predeceased child,
could assert rights under the statute. In the surrogate's court the decision was
against the grandchildren on two grounds: First, since the statute is intended
to reinforce the parent's obligation to support his minor children, upon their
death "the parent is necessarily relieved of the obligation of support, and the
nedessity for the protection afforded by the statute no longer exists". Second, the
after-born child, to come within the language of the statute, must survive the
testator.41 The Court of Appeals, however, unanimously reversed, rejecting the
idea that the statute was to be so geared to the parent's obligation of support.
It said:
"All the statutory conditions under which the statute must be
applied exist in this case. Three children were born after the making of
the will. None were provided for or in any way mentioned in the will,
and the testator died leaving them unprovided for by any settlement.
The statute does not in express terms provide that the after-born child
must survive in order to share in the distribution of the estate by representation, and we find no reason
why such a condition should be read
42
into the statute by implication."
38. Matter of Tomacelli-Filor2aritno,189 Misc. 410, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 297 (Surr.
Ct. 1947).
39. The only other case dealing with this question does so without specifically
recognizing the problem, but nonetheless seems to apply the principle unconsciously. In Matter of Cencevizky, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 90 (Surr. Ct. 1954), the
Surrogate, after holding a foreign divorce void, held that the testator's after-born
child by his second, but invalid marriage, had no rights under §26 although
unmentioned and unprovided for. When the divorce was held void, the child by
the second marriage in effect became illegitimate and thus the case is one where
an illegitimate child has no rights against its father's estate. In general, other
states have taken the same approach to illegitimate children, holding that they
can recover from the estate of a parent from whom, in an intestacy, they could
inherit. See Annots., "Illegitimate child as within contemplation of statute
regarding rights of child pretermitted by will," 142 A. L. R. 1447 (1943); and
"Illegitimacy as affecting revocation of will by subsequent birth of child," 18
A. L. R. 91 (1922).

40. 264 N. Y. 236, 190 N. E. 475 (1934).

41. 148 Misc. 160, 161, 266 N. Y. Supp. 507, 508 (Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd mem.,
240 App. Div. 982, 268 N. Y. Supp. 865 (2d Dep't 1933).
42. 264 N. Y. 236, 238, 190 N. E. 475, 476 (1934).
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The court also considered that its decision was necessary to fully realize for
grandchildren the right of representation "at least in the absence of clear expres43
sion to the contrary by the testator or by the Legislature."
It seems clear that the decisions extending the scope of the term "a child
born" in the statute, were based upon independent policies which, although they
may not have gone into the making of the statute, reflect the social desire to protect children and encourage some equality of treatment for them. In the case of
the adopted child, to put him in the position of a natural child; in the case of the
illegitimate child, to give him the full protection the legislature declared to be
forthcoming from the mother; and in the case of grandchildren, to reinforce the
equality tendency behind the right of representation. In one instance, however,
there was no independent policy on which the court could rely and it was there
faced with a constructional problem purely within the terms of the statute; that
is, whether a child already conceived at the time the will was made, but born
afterwards, was intended to be protected by the statute. The argument was made
that since the mother was pregnant at the time she or the father makes the will,
it cannot be presumed that this later born child was not considered at the time
4
the will was made. This argument was, however, rejected in Udell v. Stearns '
and a child so born was held entitled to take under the statute despite the fact
it was en ventre sa mere at the time the testator made his will. The court stated
that the only methods of rebutting the presumption of inadvertent omission
raised by the statute were those provided in the statute itself-mention or provision in the will or by settlement. And this principle was extended in McCrum
v. McCrum 45 to the case of a pregnant woman who made her will within a few
days of the delivery of the child, in the face of a trial court finding that the testatrix did in fact intend to cut off the approaching child.40 Although this case may
43. Matter of Horst, supra at 239, 190 N. E. at 476. However, it should be
noted, that the grandchildren take subject to their parent being barred under
the statute by a mention or provision in the will. Matter of Abell, 154 Misc. 250,
276 N. Y. Supp. 776 (Surr. Ct. 1935)-grandchildren of deceased child barred by

mention of children as a class; the decision does not, interestingly enough, refer
to the Horst case. There does not seem to be any discernable pattern in the
treatment of grandchildren under these statutes in other states. A few statutes
expressly include "the issue of a deceased child" or "the descendants of a child" but
the absence of such provision does not necessarily preclude the grandchildren.
For a comprehensive discussion of the problems on these points, see Comment,

Btatutonj Rights of Pretermitted Grandchildren, 44 YALE L. J. 841 (1935).

44. 125 App. Div. 196, 109 N. Y. Supp. 407 (2d Dep't 1908). The testator's
wife was eight months pregnant at the time he made his will.
45. 141 App. Div. 83, 125 N. Y. Supp. 717 (2d Dep't 1910).
46. See also Matter of Yates, supra, note 31, where child already conceived
at time of will was born after testator's death, held within the statute. In the
following cases, the courts considered the after-born child, en ventre sa mere at
the time of the will, as within the statute's protection, although the statute was
held to be avoided by mention or provision for the child: McLean v. McLean,
207 N. Y. 365 101 N. E. 178 (1913); Matter of Mitchell, 144 Misc. 262, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 440 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Matter of Goflister, 147 Misc. 257, 263 N. Y. Supp. 536
(Surr. Ct. 1933); and Matter of Von Finkenstein, 179 Misc. 375, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 108
(Surr. Ct. 1943). In the last case, the testatrix made her will while in the hospital
during confinement on the same day but just prior to delivery.
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seem to reflect the court's desire to prevent the disinheritance of a child even in
the face of a common sense inference that such a testatrix could not have "overlooked" such a child, it is more likely based upon the judicial reluctance to open
the inquiry as to testamentary intent to extrinsic evidence. If, by a literal reading of the word "born", the court is broadening the protection of the statute
to include a child who was likely contemplated by the testator, it is at the same
time narrowing the statute's protection by foreclosing the question of whether
a particular mention or provision in the will is, in the light of family circumstances, sufficient to indicate that testator considered the possibility of future children. As a practical matter-as appears in the next section-this has worked to
avoid the statute's operation in most cases that have come up.

2. Mention or provision in a will to avoid the statute's operation
Even if a court were to view the statute as a technique for protecting children from being left destitute, or of enforcing a certain equality among children,
it is clear that the statute does not provide a broad enough field of reference to
allow it to accomplish such an end reasonably. For the court does not know, nor
does the statute direct inquiry to, whether a child has other means of support,
or what provision has been made for the other children of the testator who were
living when he made his will. And even if the court views the statute--as it has
-as preservative of testamentary intent, it is equally clear that no realistic inferences of intent can be made unless consideration is given to the whole family
situation of the testator, at the time he made his will and at his death, and to his
scheme of disposition. The statute does not open the inquiry this far, since the
right of the after-born child is determined by a legislative presumption that is a
substitute for any realistic inference of fact the court might make. For example:
If a testator with three living children left his entire estate to his wife and failed
to mention or provide for later born children, the common sense inference is that
he intended his wife to take his whole estate despite the possible birth of a fourth
child. And yet under the statute the fourth child (assuming no settlement has
been made upon him) would take under the statute against his own mother, in
preference to his siblings, and contrary to testator's probable intent. On the other
hand, the statute might work in perfect consonance with the common sense inference as to the testator's intent. If the testator, in the above example, left onethird' of his estate to his wife and divided the rest of his estate among his three
children by name, we could likely conclude that he would have intended his afterborn child to share equally with the other children and the statute carries out this
intention. Between these two cases are any number of possible dispositive schemes
which would raise differing inferences depending on the family situation. But
since the statute does not direct inquiry to the family situation, the courts find
that, not only can't they enforce the family duties directly, but they can't do so
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indirectly either by carrying out the probable intent of the testator. In the face
of this, we find the courts at times importing the social factor by secretly looking
over the family situation and guiding itself accordingly in applying the statute.
The first case to deal with the meaning of "neither provided for, nor in any
way mentioned in such will" was Wormser v. Croce.47 There a testator with one
living child left his entire estate to his wife, expressing "full confidence in [her]
discretion and justice", after having recited in the exordium clause:
"..... .mindful of the uncertainty of life and being
desirous of making a just distribution of my property
among the members of my family..."
The testator had two after-born children, but the court held that they were
"mentioned" in the exordium clause within the term "family" and thus barred
from taking. It analyzed the statute as follows:
"If, therefore, it can be seen or reasonably presumed from the terms
of the will itself that the testator had in mind the probability that children might be born after the will was made, and provided with that
contingency in mind, the statute will be satisfied and the will sustained.
We think it apparent that [testator] made his will with a view to the
possibility that there might be after-born children, and that in a legal
sense he must be considered as having mentioned them in his will. It is
as if he had said: 'Because I have full confidence in the discretion and
justice of my wife, I leave all my estate to her to the end that there
may be secured a just distribution of my property among the members
of my family.' He knew, of course, that his will would become effective
only upon his death, and it was a just distribution at that time which he
wished to ensure. The word 'family,' which thd testator uses to designate
those to whom distribution is to be made, includes, by every definition,
children. Hence the meaning and effect of his will was to give the property to his wife to ensure its just distribution at his death among those
who' should then constitute his family; that is, the children then surviving, whether born before or after the execution of the will."48
The court, it should be noted, limited its inquiry to "the terms of the will
itself", and assumed that the mention or provision need not be dispositive nor
adequate for the care of the after-born children. The language of the will was
rather exceptional, however, since it spelled out so dearly the testator's mental
processes. 49 But when the holding of this case is applied to the more usual cases,
difficulty arises as to how illuminating the terms of the will alone can be.
47. Op. cit. supra, note 27.
48. Id., at 290.
49. There might, however, be a question of whether a mention in an
exordium clause, which is most of the time pro forma, is alone a sound basis for

inferring that a testator contemplated future issue; especially If the clause Is
a printed one.
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The next case dealing with this language of the statute--Stachelberg v.
Stachelberg ° -represents such a difficulty. Testator who then had no children
left his entire estate to his wife, but if she predecease him then "to lawful issue
her surviving". The testator was survived by his wife who gave birth to a posthumous child who, it was claimed, was mentioned within the term "issue" as
used in the will. Certainly if the court followed the approach of the Wormser
case, it would conclude that since he had no children at the time he 'made his
will, the reference to issue must indicate an awareness of the possibility of children born thereafter, especially where he named as primary beneficiary of the
will his wife who could care for any after-born children according to their relative needs. Tie court, however, rejected this approach and said that it was not
free to determine whether the mention was sufficient to raise the inference that
the testator considered future children when he made his will, but was limited
to determining only whether or not such after-born child as claimed under the
statute was "mentioned". It rather casuistically illustrated this distinction as follows: If a testator without children "provided that at his death his property
should go to his sons, it would clearly appear he contemplated the possibility he
might have children; but it would be equally clear that any daughters he might
have, born after the making of the will, would be in no way mentioned." Which
is another way of saying that, despite the object of the statute to carry out a
presumed testamentary intent, the statute allows only a limited number of ways
the statutory presumption of inadvertence can be rebutted. The holding in the
case was that the child could take under the statute; since the class "issue her
surviving" was deemed to include only issue living at testator's death and not
born posthumously,51 the child was held not "mentioned" within the meaning
of the statute. The court's approach here limits its inquiry in the strictest sense
to the terms of the will-determine if the child is within a class that is mentioned, if so it is barred; if not, no matter what the dispositive scheme is, or the
family situation, the child can take. On the court's reasoning it would have come
to the same result if the testator had a number of children living when he made
his will, with the anomolous result that the after-born child would take against
his mother and in preference to the other children.
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed.the Stachelberg case, it did so
50. Op. cit. supra, note 31.

51. The case seems wrong on this point, since by virtue of the intestacy law
(N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, §83(12) ) posthumous children "shall take in the
same manner as if they had been born in the lifetime of the deceased, and had
survived him." Although not a case of intestacy, the construction of the class gift
should have been governed by this principle. Certainly if it were a question of
whether the child could have taken under a vested gift, the court would have
considered him a member of the class of takers. To this extent the case has been
quarantined, if not overruled, by the holding in Holbrook v. Holbrook, 193 App.
Div. 286, 183 N. Y. Supp. 728 (2d Dep't 1920), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 600, 130 N. E. 909
(1921), where a testator left a contingent gift to such "lawful issue" as he should
leave, and the court held a posthumous child to be mentioned within the term
"issue" so as to be barred from taking under the statute.
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without opinion. The first time it did speak on this issue, it was faced with a fact
situation somewhere between the Wormser case and the Stachelberg case, and
although the result of the case seems justified only in terms of the Wormser approach, the court claimed to be applying the rule in the Stachelberg case. In
Tavshanjian v. Abbott,5 2 the testator made a codicil leaving a large legacy to a
new-born only child, and in the codicil there appeared a proviso for increasing
certain gifts on the simultaneous death of testator and his "wife and child or
children." Two children born thereafter claimed under the statute and the question was raised as to whether they were mentioned by reference to "children"
in the proviso, even though no disposition to them was made or was even dependent on the conditions in the codicil. Since the testator had only one child
at the time, it was argued that the use of the term "children" was indicative of
his awareness of the possibility of future children. The court did not entirely
reject this argument but concluded, after a review of the whole will, that
"The mention of children is not such as to convey any idea of a
purpose not to provide for those who might be born thereafter .... This
testator was contemplating the possibility of some disaster terminating
the lives of his family simultaneously and it is quite plain that it was
not the birth thereafter of children, which was in his mind, nor a provision which was to exclude them .from any share of his estate."5 3
This result may be supported only by a look at some of the facts which,
under the Stachelberg case, could not be considered: (a) At the birth of his first
child, the testator made the codicil leaving him a large legacy. (b) The widow
was left a gift in lieu of dower and the residue to strangers--a charity. (c) The
first child predeceased testator thus leaving only the after-born children surviving. From these facts we see that the court has made a reasonable inference
as to what the testator would have wanted and that the result is equitable in social
terms-there being no preference of after-born over living children, the estate
staying in the family, the widow's share alone being insufficient for her to care
for the children in the way testator would have deemed appropriate. These social factors moved the court to say that a contrary result would have left testator's only surviving children "destitute and without provision under a will of a
man of large fortune." And yet when the court crome to describe what approach
it was using, it referred to its previous affirmance (without opinion) of the
Stachelberg decision, and declared a standard which it had in fact not followed:
"We have approved of a construction of the statute, that it is not
sufficient that the will should show that the testator had in mind the
possibility of children born after the making of the will. The child will
52.
53.

200 N. Y. 374, 93 N. E. 978 (19f1).
Id., at 377-378, 93 N. E. at 978-979.
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take, unless it5is4 mentioned in some way, or included in some class that
is mentioned."
The result of the Tavshanjian case may be considered a happy one, reflecting an awareness of both inferred testamentary intent and social ends, but this
standard does not-and did not-encourage other courts to take as broad an
approach. For by directing inquiry away from what "the testator had in mind,"
the court is limited to the job of matching the after-born child to the class mentioned in the will to see if he fits. In fact, this is exactly what happened-no
court, since the Tavshanjian case, has actually looked into whether the mention
or provision in the will is sufficient to indicate an awareness of the possibility of
children, but has assumed that any mention at all, in whatever context, indicates
such awareness and satisfies the statute.
In McLean v..McLean,55 the Court of Appeals gave final expression to this
standard when it viewed the question as merely: Is the after-born child included
in a class that is mentioned? In holding that an after-born child, who may have
taken a contingent class gift if the conditions of the gift had been satisfied, was
"mentioned" within the class so as to bar the child under the statute, the court
developed its argument as follows:
"It is, of course, apparent that the opportunity for individual and
specific 'mention' of children to be born in the future is limited and it
must be regarded as settled that mention of such children as a class and
in terms broad enough to include a specific child is in this respect a
sufficient compliance with the statute, and further that this mention may
be made in the form of a provision for them. (Wormser v. Croce, 120
App. Div. 287; Stachelberg v. Stachelberg, 124 App. Div. 232; affirmed, 192 N. Y. 576; Tavshanjian v.Abbott, 200 N. Y. 374.)
.
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"While it may not be necessary for the disposition of this case, we
are naturally led to consider the other requirement of the statute in the
alternative that 'provision' be made for children of subsequent birth, it
being urged that a contingent remainder at least does not satisfy the
statutory test.
"I think that in the light of the principles underlying the adoption
of the statute as they have been recognized in this state, what was said
in the cases referred to in holding that the requirement for mention of
after-born children is satisfied by a provision for them as a class, naturally if not necessarily leads to the further conclusion that the other and
54. Id., at 377, 93 N. E. at 978-979, quoting from the Stachelberg opinion.
This passage actually appears in the midst of the previous extract, thus straining
considerably the logic of its argument.
55. 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178 (1913).
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alternative requirement of the statute for provision for such children
is satisfied by a will, whereby the testator makes it apparent that he had
in mind the possibility of such children, and makes a devise or bequest
in their favor, even though such bequest or devise involves some element of uncertainty such as incident, for instance, to a contingent remainder, or of apparent inadequacy.
"In construing the statute we are to study it as a whole, and we
are justified in interpreting one of its alternative requirements somewhat by reference to the meaning of the other. Inasmuch as the legislature has permitted a testator to meet the possibility of after-born children by mention or provision, and inasmuch as it has been held that
'mention' may be made through a very general provision, it would be
somewhat idle if not inconsistent to hold that in order to be effective as
a 'provision' a bequest or devise must be vested, certain and adequate."50
The development may be observed as follows: In the Wormser case,
a mere mention was considered sufficient because it indicated in its context that
testator actually contemplated the possibility of future children and made provision for such event; in the McLean case, the court concluded that if a mere
mention in a non-dispositive clause was sufficient, certainly a mention in a dispositive provision must be sufficient, without looking into the because, Thus
the term "provided for" in the statute lost all reference to actual provision for
the child's care, it being comprehended within the term "mentioned". Although
the McLean case holding is reasonable in terms of the testatrix' probable intent,
she having had no children at the time she made her will and having referred
to "my issue", the application of its principles have been rather formalistic, with
the ,courts disregarding the question of intent, and taking for granted that any
mention of a class which might include the after-born child is sufficient, by
force of the statute, to rebut the presumption of inadvertant pretermission.
Since the McLean case, the surrogate's courts have consistently followed it
whenever faced with a contingent gift to a class of which the after-born child
was a member, and have always found the child mentioned and therefore barred
under the statute.57 Similarly, they have followed the same principle in dealing
with cases of mere mention, in line with the .W'ormser case, and with one exception found the child mentioned and therefore barred, without looking into the
56. Id, at 372-373, 101 N. E. at 179-180.

57. Matter of Jones, 134 Misc. 26, 234 N. Y. Supp. 316 (Surr. Ct. 1929),
contingent class gift to "descendants"; Matter of Land, 160 Misc. 780, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 637 (Surr. Ct. 1936), to "my children who shall survive me"; Matter of
Donaldson, 165 Misc. 661, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1938), to "my Issue me
surviving"; Matter of Feuermann, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 738 (Surr. Ct. 1944), to "descendants"; Matter of Keech, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 231 (Surr. Ct. 1947), to "my children";
and Matter of Shea, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (Surr. Ct. 1949), to 'my children". A dictum
in an early case, Minot v. Minot, 17 App. Div. 521, 45 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1st Dep't
1897), to the effect that a contingent gift which did not vest in the after-born
child would not be a sufficient provision in the will to bar the child, was rejected
in the McLean opinion, and has not been referred to since.
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question of intent.58 It might be said that to whatever extent the courts have
extended the coverage of the statute by a broad construction 'of the term "chil',
they have narrowed the protection by finding a mention that will avoid the statute
in almost every case. However, this would be a misleading statement without
a look at the facts of the cases coming before the surrogates: in every one of the
cases following the Wormser decision, the testator left all, or substantially all,
his estate to his spouse who, being the parent of the after-born child, woulc
likely care for such child; in every case following the McLean decision, where the
facts of the family situation appear, the spouse was the primary beneficiary of
the estate. Thus the surrogates may not be said to have ignored the social purpose of the statute. The language of the will was generally clear in indicating a.
contemplation of future children. But more important, the dispositive schemes
being quite "natural", the probable testamentary intent may be considered coterminous with the family duty. Thus, the surrogates were secure that the results
58. Matter of Dick, 117 Misc. 635, 191 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Surr. Ct. 1922),
language used in the will being "In the event of my leaving legitimate issue, I
annul this entire will ... and devise to my wife my entire estate"-testator had
no children living at time he made his will; Matter of Brown, 133 Misc. 457, 233
N. Y. Supp 145 (Surr. Ct. 1929), "confidence and faith that my wife will do
everything for our son, or any children that may be born to us"--one child living
at time of will; Matter of Mitchell, 144 Misc. 262, 258 N. Y. Supp. 440 (Surr. Ct.
1932), "If there be any issues surviving me; [my wife] wil1 amply care and
provide for them"-one child living at time of will; Matter of Callister,147 Misc.
257, 263 N. Y. Supp. 536 (Surr. Ct. 1933), "I make no provision for any issue that
may survive me as I feel confident that my beloved wife. . ."-no child living at
time of will; Matter of Dooling, 158 Misc. 333, 285 N. Y. Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct.
1936), "having full confidence in my beloved wife to take the necessary care of
and make provision for our children, I have omitted to make any specific bequests
to them"-seven children living at time of will; Matter of Dawson, 192 Misc.
783, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 453 (Surr. Ct. 1948), "notwithstanding that I may have children
hereafter born to me"-one child living at time of will; Matter of Meng, 201
Misc. 589, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 263 (Surr. Ct. 1952), "notwithstanding any children
which may be hereafter born to us"--no child living at time of will; Matter of
Green, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 278 (Surr. Ct. 1953), "knowing that [my wife] will properly
and at all times care and maintain our children"--no facts as to living children;
Matter of Kreutz, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (Surr. Ct. 1944), "I hereby nominate my
wife . .. as guardian of the person and of the estate of any of my children who
may not have become of legal age at the date of my decease"-one child living
at time of will. (The class in which the after-born child was deemed mentioned
is italicized in each case.) The one exception to this line of cases following the
Wormser decision is Crocker v. Mulligan, 154 App. Div. 711, 139 N. Y. Supp. 381
(2d Dep't 1913) where a testator with three living children left his estate to his
wife, declaring he had "not mentioned any of our children or given to them any
portion of my estate for the reason that I have the fullest confidence in my
wife," and the court held that the term "our children" did not include the afterborn child, who, therefore, not being mentioned, could take under the statute.
The court held this way despite the fact that it acknowledged "it is beyond
reason that the father would have denied a gift to any one of his three living
daughters and given something to issue that might be born." Id., at 713, 139
N. Y. Supp. at 383. The only possible explanation for the decision is that it was
considered on a submitted statement of facts and may have been the result of
some family compromise; the opinion is very short and there is no discussion of
authority. The language of the Dooling case, supra, is indistinguishable from
this case and is probably sounder law. The Crocker case has been distinguished
on its language and impliedly rejected in the Land and Callister cases, as well
as the Dooling case, supra.
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reflected testamentary intent without going further than the language of the will.
Where, however, the inferred testamentary intent did not so perfectly fit into
the social notions of testator's family duties, then the surrogates have had to
struggle between the literal reading of the statute, so firmly established by precedent, and an impulse to get socially sound results for the family.
Matter of Mtlqueen59 represents such a case. There a testator with three
living children left the principal part of his estate to his wife, with an alternative gift if she predecease him "to my children equally," providing for a division of
the gift into thirds and later in the will naming the three living children. The wife
having survived the testator, the three living children took nothing. An after-born
child was allowed to take under the statute on the ground that it was not mentioned within the term "children" since the will itself had, in effect, described
the class as bein limited to the three living children. The court realized the inequity of the result, and that it was probably contrary to what the testator would
have wanted, but felt that it had to apply the rule of the McLean case. It could
not, it said, accept a "construction of expediency" for, it pointed out, if the wife
had not survived, the after-born child would surely take under the statute.60 It
could not, it felt, gear the results to an inquiry into what testator would have
desired, but had to content itself with determining whether he "mentioned" the
child within the meaning of the statute.
A more difficult problem, and one which focuses the court's temptation to
seek acceptable social results within the strict application of the statute, occurs
when the testator has married twice and has two sets of children. In Matter of
1
Freisinger,6
a testator with one living child left his entire estate to his wife, but
if she predecease him or die in a common disaster, then "to those children only
who survive me." He later divorced his wife, remarried, had two after-born children by his second wife, and died. If we were to consider whether a reference to
"children" by a man with one child indicates a contemplation of future children,
we might answer in the affirmative and bar the after-born children as having
been mentioned. And similarly we could hold that the after-born children came
within the strict terms of the class "mentioned" and were thus barred. However,
the court, perhaps out of a desire to reach some fair result in terms of the two
families, construed the class of "children" in the will as being limited to children
of the first wife, thus concluding that the after-born children of the second mar59.
213 App. Div. 637, 211 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd mem.,
241 N. Y. 583, 150 N. E. 564 (1925).
60. Id., at 642, 211 N. Y. Supp. at 233. Accord: Matter of Leonard, 73 N. Y. S.
2d 770 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
61. 263 App. Div. 970, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 196 (2d Dep't 1942), af]'d mem., 289
N. Y. 697, 45 N. E. 2d 456 (1942).
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riage were not "mentioned" and could therefore take under the statute.6 2 The
results are very neat, and cannot be questioned on social grounds: the second wife
would take one-third of the estate by election, the two after-born children would
take their intestate shares under the statute, or two-ninths each, and the remaining two-ninths would be left to the first wife which would benefit her child.
When we compare this case to a similar one, Matter of Niles,65 we can see
how far the courts' concern for results has moved them in cases where there is
not a normal family situation. A testator had three children by a first marriage
and made a will after his divorce and while as yet not remarried, leaving part of
his estate in trust for his first wife for life, remainder "to such issue of mine
who may be then living." Thereafter, he remarried, his second marriage was
annulled, and after the decree of annulment the second wife gave birth to a child
which was found to be the child of the testator. It would seem more reasonable
here, than in the Freisinger case, to hold that the class of "issue" mentioned in
the will referred only to issue of the first wife, since the class was to take after
a life estate in the first wife, and the testator had more than one child living at
the time he made his will But such a holding would allow the after-born child
by the second wife to take against the will, which would prefer him to children
of the first marriage. The court held that the child of the second marriage was
included in the class of issue mentioned in the will and therefore barred from
taking under the statute.64 But under this holding, the child shared in the gift
made in the will, the result being that all children were treated equally.65 Probably, if the limitation in the will was a contingent gift which failed, the court
would have held the after-born child outside the class and so eligible to take, not
under the will, but under the statute. So long, it seems, as the courts cannot look
directly at the family situation or testator's scheme of disposition they will be
62. Although this does not appear in the Memorandum opinions in either
the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals, apparently heavy weight was
placed upon the fact that in another clause of the will the testator states why
he is not leaving anything to his then living only child, declaring that he reposes
confidence in his wife to care for "our children." By taking the construction of
"our children" from this clause, which clearly relates to the children of that
marriage, and applying it to the dispositive clause, the Court concluded the
dispositive clause included only children of that first marriage. (See Record on
Appeal, p. 40, 5722 CASES & POINTS). In the argument, however, it is suggested
that the Appellate Division had accepted the position that the children of the
second marriage could have shared in the alternative gift, if the first wife had
predeceased the testator. But this seems doubtful under the holding.
63. 199 Misc. 335, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
64. The cases may be reconciled if we avoid the question of "mention"' and
go back to the original notion behind the statute. We can say that the Freisinger
testator was not contemplating the possibility of future children by any other
wife but his present one, and that the Niles testator, being at the time of his will
unmarried, was contemplating the possibility of future children by another
future wife. In the arguments before the Court of Appeals, this position was
taken in the Fre*.singercase. Op. cit. supra,note 62..
65. This result was not, however, an easy one to reach. The children of the
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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forced to do so indirectly if they are to come to such socially desirable results
as we presume a testator would have intended.0
3. Provision by way of settlement as avoiding the statute's operation
The meaning of the language of the statute as to mention or provision in
the will was construed and settled, as above discussed, before the courts determined the nature of the "settlement" the statute contemplated. If the meaning
of the term "settlement" had been placed before the courts without these precedents, the courts might have taken the view that a settlement effective under
the statute was one that would actually support the after-born child. But as it
was, once it was determined that a testator's provision for the child in the will
need not be vested, certain or adequate, it seemed unnecessary if not unreasonable to require that the settlement be vested, certain or adequate either.s 7 Where
cases arose under the "settlement" language, the surrogates applied the principles
of the McLean and Wormser cases directly to any transaction outside a will whereby property was or might be transferred to an after-born child. What the nature
of the settlement had to be, was not articulated, but from the cases it was clear
that the court looked upon the transaction pretty much the way they did the will.
If the after-born child was "mentioned" in any way, usually within a class of
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
first marriage took the position that testator, who had secured an uncontested
Nevada divorce, had never been legally divorced from the first wife, and that
therefore the after-born child was illegitimate and could neither take under the
statute nor share in the gift made in the will or in intestate property. Once
barrirng him under the statute, the court, to find the child legitimate, had to
hold as follows: although the children of the first marriage could collaterally
attack the foreign divorce decree, they had not sustained the burden of proving
a jurisdictional defect; although the after-born child was born 291 days after the
annulment, and the average normal period of gestation was 280 days, the court
would recognize some reasonable leeway in upholding the legitimacy of the Issue
of the marriage. This latter argument was also colored by the fact that there
was evidence that the testator had cohabited with the second wife after the
interlocutory decree and even after the final decree. Despite the obviousness of
the court's struggle to protect the after-born child, this is not an example of a
defect in the judicial process; rather of a certain strength. For, in dealing with
what is a patently abnormal situation, the normal judicial activity must be
accommodating if it is not to be unjust.
66. The results the testator would have intended had he the knowledge the
court has before it is, of course, different from the results that would flow from
construing the language of the will as, it is decided, he intended at the time he
executed the will. The problem, as has been commented upon rather often, is that

the testator probably had no intent at all relating to the matter in issue, and
perhaps none as relates to the application of particular words to circumstances
he had not contemplated. See generally, Part II (note 96, infra).

67. However, it was established that the settlement had to be made by the
parent-testator to be effective, and the court could not consider outside sources
of income for the after-born child which may have been established by other
members of the family. (Matter of Bostwick, 78 Misc. 695, 140 N. Y. Supp. 588
(Surr. Ct. 1912) where remainder in a trust created by father of testator, after
a life estate in the testator, held to be no settlement). To this extent, the courts
recognized the settlement as a reflection of the testator's intent to cure his
oversight.
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possible beneficiaries, the transaction was deemed a sufficient settlement although
he did not in fact enjoy any benefit. The settlement might take the form of insurance, 8 Totten trusts, 69 or an inter vivos trust.70 It might be made before the
will was executed, 7 1 or afterwards; 72 before the after-born child was born,73 or
afterwards;7 4 and whether it was in fact enjoyed or not.75 As in the cases involving mention in the will, it should be noted that in every case where the facts
appear, 76 the testator left all his estate to his spouse, whether or not there were
living children; and, in the relative treatment of living children and after-born
children, generally provided by settlement for the living children in the same
manner as he did for the after-born. Thus it can be seen, the results in barring
the after-born child from taking under the statute, are sound from both the
point of view of probable testaimentary intent and social ends.
This long line of surrogate's decisions was deviated from in only one case,
68. In Matter of Brant, 121 Misc. 102, 201 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Surr. Ct. 1923);
Matter of Froeb, 143 Misc. 660, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of
Hagendorn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (Surr. Ct. 1943); Matter of Kraston, 58 N. Y. S.
2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945); and Matter of Stone, 200 Misc. 639, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775
(Surr. Ct. 1951) each of the testators, after the birth of the after-born child,
took out insurance which was payable to such child absolutely. In Matter of
Kreutz, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (Sur. Ct. 1944), the testator, after the birth of the
after-born child, named all his children contingent beneficiaries under an
insurance settlement agreement. In Matter of Backer, 148 Misc. 318, 266 N. Y.
Supp. 47 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of Kirk, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (Surr. Ct. 1948); and
Matter of Schwabacher,202 Misc. 15, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (Surr. Ct. 1952), each of
the testators, before he had made his will, had named "children" as beneficiaries
of insurance. In the Schwabaoher case, the children had a contingent interest
which apparently failed, and so they took nothing under the settlement.
69. In Matter of Curry, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1940), and Matter of
Hartman, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (Surr. Ct. 1945), the testator, after the birth or
adoption of the child, made Totten trust deposits naming the child as the.
beneficiary.
70. In Matter of Von Finkenstein, 179 Misc. 375, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 108 (Surr.
Ct. 1943), the testatrix, after the birth of the after-born child, entered into a
supplemental agreement amending a trust which had been previously established
by her mother, whereby a vested remainder in the trust was created for the afterborn child. Because of the holding in the Bostwick case, supra, note 67, that the
settlement to be effective under the statute had to come from the parent, the
court dealt with this case as if the testarix (the parent) was the effective source
of the property because, without the supplemntal agreeement, no property could
have vested in the child. Although they did not characterize it as such, the use
of the supplemental agreement appeared to be the exercise of an implied power
of appointment.
71. Backer, Kirk, and Schwabacher cases, supra, note 68.
72. Brant, Froeb, Hagendorn, Kraston, Stone and Kreutz cases, supra,
note 68.
73. Cases cited supra, note 71.
74. Cases cited supra, note 72.
75. No benefit was enjoyed in the Schwabacher case, supra, note 68. Also,
in the Kreutz case, supra, note 68, the children's interest in the insurance settlement was subject to being divested by the spouse who survived and who had the
right to invade the principal proceeds. In all the other cases cited, the after-born
child took a vested interest under the settlement.
76. Only in the Kirk and Schwabacher cases, supra, note 68, are the facts as
to the disposition in the will missing from the opinion. In the Froeb case, supra,
note 68, testator left a nominal gift of $100 to an only living child.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Matter of Stern,77 which, on the basis of a special reading of the history of the
statute, held that the "settlement" contemplated by the legislature was one which
was made prior to or contemporaneously with the will, and in a formal document such as an ante-nuptial agreement which expressly made provision for the
future children.78 Such an approach, it was maintained, was the only way to prevent what was in effect a partial revocation of a will by extrinsic non-testamentary evidence. This position was rejected by most of the surrogates,1 9 it being
pointed out that the proof of the settlement was of such independent legal significance as to be consonant with the general principles of the statute of wills; 80
and, as to the requirement that the settlement be made prior to or contemporaneous
with the will, it was noted that "it was unlikely that a person who fails to contemplate the possibility of future issue in his formal testament will have remem-.
81
bered them in a settlement made before the will and before they exist."
Whatever doubt was cast by the Stern decision on the practice of the surrogates of applying the McLean and Wormser principles, was put to rest by the
77. 189 Misc. 639, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 631 (Surr. Ct. 1945). The testator had made
a will while his wife was pregnant leaving all his estate to his wife; after the
birth of a daughter he purchased for her $1200 in government bonds, and died
four months later. The gross estate was $37,000. The Surrogate held that the
bonds were not a settlement but only "the natural expression of parental joy on
the part of the deceased over the birth of his daughter." Id., at 650, 56 N. Y. S.
2d at 640.
78. The case relies heavily on the view that the word "settlement" as used
in §26 is intended to mean the same thing as a "settlement" under §35, N. Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, which provides for a revocation of the will if there Is a
subsequent marriage and birth of issue, "unless provision shall have been made
for them by some settlement." (See note 25, supra.) This language, deriving from
the original statute, was amended (L. 1932, c. 459) by changing the word "settlement" to read "ante-nuptial agreement." Contrary to the view taken in this
case, this might indicate that the word "settlement" as used in the original §35,
and as continued to be used in §26, was something distinct from an ante-nuptial
type agreement; especially since the word "settlement" in the original §35 was
used to qualify "issue" and was not intended to protect the wife who then had
her dower rights. (REv. STAT. of 1830, Part II, c. VI, Title I, §43).
79. Surrogate Delehanty had previously accepted the majority view, at least
in dictum, in the Backer case, supra, note 68. Although Judge Fuld In the
majority opinion in the Faber case, infra, note 82, cites the Backer case as a,
previous inconsistent position held by Surrogate Delehanty, the decision in that
case is not on the facts inconsistent with the tern decision. (See court's footnote
2, 305 N. Y. 200, 205, 111 N. E. 2d 883, 886 (1953) ). Surrogate Collins was the
only surrogate to follow the Stern decision; Matter of Robinson, 188 Misc. 720,
66 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1946) and Matter of Kirk, 191 Misc. 473, 80 N. Y. S.
2d 387 (Surr. Ct. 1948), although the latter case was decided on another point;
see supra, note 68. Interestingly enough, in the Kirk case, the Surrogate held
that a contingent provision made prior to the will was a good settlement, but, on
the basis of the Stern decision, that vested settlements made after the will were
not good.
80. Matter of Stone, 200 Misc. 639, 641, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775, 777 (Surr. Ct.
1951). See also, Matter of Kraston,supra, note 68.
81. Matter of Stone, supra,note 80.
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Court of Appeals in Matter of Faber,8 2 which expressly rejected the reasoning
of the Stern case, approved the practice of the surrogates as a proper one, and
articulated this practice into a standard for the future guidance of the surrogates.
The court in considering what the legislature meant by the term "settlement",
adverted to the purpose of the statute, thus:
"Its sole objective was to assure that, if through oversight, they
were neglected in the will, other provision would be made for them.
The Legislature did not choose, and has not chosen to specify the character or content of the essential 'settlement' or to prescribe any definite
yardstick for determining whether one has been effected. Accordingly,
it is the fact situation in each case that must be considered and appraised, with a view to determining whether the parent intended a
given out-of-will provision to serve the purpose of a 'settlement' under
section 26. The touchstone is intent, and no court can decree in advance
the essential factors upon which a particular testator's intention may be
predicated. Such factors as the character and-size of the provision for
the after-born child, the circumstances under which it was made, the
value of the entire estate and, as here, the nature of the provision made
for another child, may undoubtedly serve as signposts to the testator's
intention."8 3
The court concluded, citing with approval earlier decisions by the surrogate's courts: (1) "The 'settlement' may be effected at any time; it need not be
made before or contemporaneously with the execution of the will." (2) "It need
not assume any particular form . . ." (3) "It need not be an irrevocable interest, forever placed beyond the control or dominion of the testator . . .and it
may, indeed be contingent, payable upon the child's surviving someone other
4
than the testator."
82. 305 N. Y. 200, 111 N. E. 2d 883 (1953). A five to two decision, the
majority opinion being written by Fuld, J. The dissenters in the Court of Appeals

based their arguments to some extent on the approach of the Stern case, taking
the position that (1) the settlement should be by some formally executed document, (2) should give the child an absolute rather than contingent interest, and
(3) that there be "weighty evidence inside or outside the writing" that the
testator intended it as a settlement to provide for the child after his death.
Id., at 208-9. They did not go so far as the Stern case to require the settlement
be made prior fo or contemporaneous with the will. On this point, it was apparently recognized that a "settlement" made before the will would be as extrinsic
to the will as one made thereafter; what the dissenters wanted of this extrinsic
"settlement" were some formal assurances which would substitute for a will or
codicil. But, of course, the recent policies inducing judicial or legislative recognition of Totten trusts, survivorship bonds, pension rights, and other conventional modes of transferring property on death, as valid outside the statute of
wills, apply as well in this situation, and the majority seemed to assume this.
See note 9, supra.
83. 305 N. Y. at 203-4, 111 N. E. 2d at 885.
84. Id., at 204-5, 111 N. E. 2d at 885-6. The Court also argued, in rejecting
the Stern case's reading of the legislative history, that when the legislature
revised the Decedent Estate Laws in 1930-32 it retained the term "any settlement"
in §26, while changing the language of §35 from "some settlement" to "an antenuptial agreement," thus not only giving tacit legislative approval to the judicial
interpretation of the statute up to that time, but indicating that it meant something different from ante-nuptial agreement when it used the term "settlement."
See supra, note 78.
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This decision, however, raises a logical problem. How, it might be asked,
can some act taking place after testator made his will reflect on his state of mind
at the time he made the will? How can the subsequent act be a guide in determining whether the testator was aware of the possibility of future children when
he made his will? Although this question was not expressed, it seems to have
been implied by the Stern opinion. One answer might be that the later settlement indicates that, at the time of making the will, the testator had in mind a
plan to provide for after-born children by way of such settlement. The reply to
this would be: if the testator was at all aware, at the time of making his will,
of the possibility of future children he probably would have mentioned them in
the will. 85 The solution would appear to be in the view taken by the Faber case,
and the preponderance of authority in the surrogate's courts, that the statute
itself is intended not only to cure an oversight itself by giving an inadvertently
omitted child his intestate sharebut also to allow the testator himself to cure
his oversight by acting after the will was made, in such a manner that his intention need no longer be presumed, since it is expressed. It has been pointed out
that the holding in the Stern*case "renders the statute practically meaningless." 80
Under it, once a will had omitted to mention after-born issue, nothing but a new
will or a codicil to the will could avoid the statute, and the phrase as to "settlement" could therefore be practically dropped from the statute. More important:
how can a testator before he has children reasonably provide for them? In what
manner? What amounts? It would seem that the standard laid down by the Faber
case is a sound one, and especially so in that it returns to "intent" as the critical
element. It is a standard which goes much beyond what had been the practise of
the surrogates in following the McLean and Wormser cases, for it opens up the
inquiry into family factors which could not be considered when the issue was
mention or provision in the will.
However, the application of this standard in the Faber case itself raised
serious problems, which may lead us to doubt that it is as flexible as it seems.
At the time he made his will, the testator in the Faber case had one living daugh.
ter, Adell, and he left his entire estate in trust for his wife for life, remainder to
Adell. Thereafter, another daughter, Sandra, was born, and the following transactions took place: The testator purchased a life insurance policy payable to
Sandra, and later changed the beneficiaries of several life insurance policies, including the one payable to Sandra, making both daughters equal beneficiaries.
Did these acts constitute a "settlement" that would bar the after-born child from
85. See text supra at note 81.
86. Wheeler, J. in dissent in Faber case, when in the Appellate Division. 280
App. Div. 394, 398, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 119, 123 (4th Dep't 1952). The whole court
in the Appellate Division rejected the Stern case and accepted the standard which
was then current and was later articulated in the Court of Appeals. Two of five
appellate justices, however, in applying the standard, felt that the testator had
not intended to make a settlement on the after-born child. See discussion In
text, infra.
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taking under the statute? On the basis of the standard set down, the Court of
Appeals87 and three justices of the Appellate Division answered: yes, since-as
they viewed it-the testator's acts reflected an intent to cure the testamentary oversight. But two justices in the Appellate Division dissented, s and by applying
the same standard concluded that the testator's acts did not indicate an intent to
make provision for the after-born daughter by settlement, nor cure the testamentary oversight. The argument of the dissenters runs as follows: The value of
the estate was $110,000 and the insurance $34,000; by providing equally for his
two daughters to take the insurance, the testator could not-when the contents
of his will are considered-be thought to have intended such "an unnatural
• . . discrimination" between his daughters as that the after-born should take
$17,000 in insurance and nothing from the estate while the other child took
$17,000 in insurance plus a remainder interest in the $110,000 estate. The argument of the majority, that the statute was not intended to assure equality of distribution among children, was answered by the dissenters that they were not
"unaware of such a principle," but they were considering the value of the respective
shares not to assure equality but only "as one of the pertinent circumstances" to
be considered in determining the testator's intent.8 9 And As a caution, it would
seem, against the automatic applications of a rule, as in the cases following the
McLean decision, the dissenters said: "To arbitrarily assert that every gift of
proceeds of an insurance policy is, in every instance, a settlement which precludes
the after-born child from participation in the estate of its deceased parent strips
the statute of all sense and justice."90
However, even if we were to accept the interpretation of the dissenters, we
would have a result which is perhaps as out of line with what can be inferred
of testator's irftdnt as the one they object to; that is, the after-born child would
take an intestate share of the testator's estate absolutely while the other child
would take only a remainder after the life estate in the wife. The nearest we can
come to what the testator would have intended, had he been aware of the possi.
bility of future children when he made his will, is that he would have wanted
both children to share the remainder after the .life estate in the wife. But of
course that might bring us into the whole fruitless area of argument as to whether
the testator by not changing his will meant to prefer the named child over the
after-born, or whether this failure to change the will was also a result of inadvertance, or whether the testator may be presumed to know what result would
come about if he did not change his will, etc. The issue is insoluble in these
terms mainly because the statute, in giving the after-born child his intestate share
87. The two dissenters in the Court of Appeals did not accept the standard
laid down by the majority. See note 82, supra.
88. The two dissenters in the Appellate Division did accept the standard
laid down by the majority. See note 86, supra. Referred to hereinafter as "the
dissenters".
89. Id., at 399-400, 114 N. Y. S. 2d at 124-125.
90. Id., at 399, 114 N. Y. S. 2d at 124.
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or nothing, cannot be accomodated to any realistic inferences, of testamentary
intent-inferences based upon the will and the family situation, putting aside any
other extrinsic evidence of intent, which might reasonably be kept out on the
same grounds we keep it out in construing wills generally. Even taking the will
and family situation alone, the statute might in its operation fit the testamentary
intent or not, depending on rather arbitrary factsY1 This is true mainly because
the basis for the statute is only half sound. It may be reasonable to presume that
a testator who left an after-born child unprovided for would, if aware of this
contingency, have provided for him, but it is not reasonable to presume that he
2
would have left the child his intestate shareY
It may be said that despite the liberal standard set down in the Faber case,03
the court cannot really make sensible inferences when they have available to it
such an inflexible remedy: the after-born child takes his intestate share or nothing. The court becomes a kind of Procrustes who is allowed to make a free and
real inquiry into whether the claimant fits the statute, but once it decides must
use the ax or the rack. Another element which, no doubt, must plague a court
making such an inquiry, is what the remedy does to the testamentary scheme. By
giving the after-born child his intestate share absolutely we must seriously impair
any scheme of trusts the testator may have set up. If the dissenters had prevailed
in the Faber case, the after-born child would have taken her intestate share out of
the trust set up for her mother, although it is clear that testator intended his wife
to 'enjoy the benefit of the whole estate during her life, 14 and his children to enjoy
only a remainder. Implicit in the testator's scheme, as in many of the cases we have
91. If a testator left everything to his wife, but if she predecease him then

to an only named child, the statute would carry out the intent of the testator,
or run contrary to it, depending on whether the wife survives him. If the wife
predeceases him, then an after-born child under the statute, by taking his Intestate share, would divide the estate with the child named in the will-and the
presumed intent of the testator would be carried out. If, on the other hand, the
wife survives the testator, the child named in the will takes nothing, and the
after-born child takes an intestate share-a result that is impossible to justify
in terms of intent. By giving the after-born child an intestate share in all events
where the statute operates, it often works contrary to testator's probable intent
and usually results in an unnatural preference being given after-born children
over children living when the will was made. This is discussed in detail In Part
II of the article. See note 96, infra.
92. Since we have no reasonable basis for presuming that testator would
have provided for the after-born child with an intestate share, or its equal, the
statute cannot be completely rationalized in terms of carrying out testamentary
intent. Perhaps, to this extent, the statute's social end must be rationalized in
positivistic terms: If a testator does not indicate in some prescribed manner that
he considered his future children, the law deals with it as if he had not properly
expressed his intent in the first place-such as if he had failed to execute his will

according to the statute of wills- and his property is distributed as if there were
an intestacy. This viewpoint is expressed in the quote from the McLean case,

supra, at note 28.
93. One point the Faber case has not resolved, although it has illuminated,
is whether an outright gift to an after-born child may be considered a settlement. The Faber case seems to assume the "character" of the settlement as,
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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seen, is that a testator is making provision for his spouse to some extent out of
the faith he reposes in the spouse to care for their children. And of course the
testator's approach is a sound one, for he realizes that his surviving spouse will
be better able to appraise and satisfy the needs of their respective children in
the light of later circumstances which he could not possibly foresee. To the extent that the surviving spouse is obligated by statute to support and care for their
minor children, the testator may be thought to be legally as well as morally
justified in reposing this confidence in her.
A system of testamentary freedom presupposes that by letting each testator
express his individaul intent with respect to his property we provide a fair mode
for carrying out family obligations with some flexibility. But in the light of the
incongruities between the testator's probable intent and the operation of a statute
such as we have been dealing with, we are forced to ask whether such a statute
can operate successfully at all. Although the Faber case very sensibly sets a broad
area into which the court can inquire, thus showing a greater awareness of the
social factors subsumed within the statute,95 the results will not realistically
reflect the testator's intent or an equitable adjustment of family interests
so long as the remedy of the statute has no relation to that intent. This
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
in some way, relating to the death of the testator. A case prior to the Faber case,
Matter of Griffin, 159 Misc. 12, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct. 1936), considered
the question of whether $7.13 placed in a piggy bank for an after-adopted child
by the testator, and later put into a Totten trust for the child by the testator's
wife, was a settlement. Although the common sense answer seems obvious, the
court felt rather strained in the face of the precedents that inadequacy of the
settlement did not matter. It held it was not a settlement on the ground that the
context of the transaction indicated that testator's acts were intended to teach
the child thrift, rather than provide for the child. Presumably under the Faber
decision, a court would not be constrained to find some other motive for the
testator's acts in order to hold that such a gift was no settlement. Some questions
relating to gifts, however, may still be open: Is an outright gift of a large amount
presumed to be a "settlement", as it is an advancement in the case of an intestacy? Is a gift of such a nature that we can call it a "settlement" at all?-it
doesn't, by its own terms, look toward the testator's death as do insurance, Totten
trusts, or survivorship interests. If a gift is not considered a settlement to bar
the child under the statute, will it be considered an advancement which he must
bring into hotchpot for the purpose of computing his share as "if [his] parent
had died intestate"? On a similar point, as to whether a child taking under the
statute can bring in advancements made to other children for the purpose of computing his intestate share, there is a conflict of authority. A New York court, in
an early case, held that he can, Sanford v. Sanford, 61 Barb. 293 (Sup. Ct. 1872);
the majority and better view is that he cannot, Gibson v. Johnson, 331 Mo. 1198,
56 S. W. 2d 783, 88 A. L. R. 369 (1932) and 3 WOERNER, AMERIcAN LAW
OF ADMINISTRATION 1935 (3d ed. 1923).
94. The life estate happened also to be defeasible on her remarriage. In
face of this, might it not be argued that so long as she remained a widow, and
presumably caring for their children, the testator intended her to enjoy the life
interest undiminished by any share going to an after-born child?
95. In general, since the Faber case, the opinions of the surrogates have
articulated and given greater weight to those "signposts" suggested in the Faber
opinion. Matter of Harmetz, 204 Misc. 942, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 268 (Surr. Ct. 1953)
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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will be increasingly true as the courts must face more and more cases of
"abnormal" family situations. Thus the question-Can the statute be made to
work in consonance with a testator's probable intent?-must be answered by
asking another, perhaps more fundamental, question: Shall we look to what the
testator intended when he did or did not use certain language in his will, or to
what the testator would have intended now, had he been aware of his family
situation at his death? The second part of this article will be directed to these
problems, and to whether we can solve them within a system of testamentary
freedom or must, on the other hand, face directly the alternative of giving up
this system in large measures and adopting some Civil Law approach or some
method of testator's dependents' relief. 0
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Totten trusts and jointly owned savings bonds for named after-born children;

Matter of Sorenson, 205 Misc. 26, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 837 (Surr. Ct. 1954) Totten
trusts for named after-born child; Matter of Anderson, 205 Misc. 151, 131 N. Y. S.
2d 163 (Surr. Ct. 1954) savings bonds payable on death to after-born child; Matter
of Smith, I Misc. 2d 451, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 706 (Surr. Ct. 1955) insurance contingently payable to children as a class; and Matter of Swenson, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 206
(Surr. Ct. 1956) insurance contingently payable to one after-born child, absolutely payable to another. In all the foregoing cases, the acts were held to be
"settlements"; as in the other cases, the spouse was generally the primary beneficiary and the after-born child was treated pretty much the way the children
living at the time of the will were. In the Sorenson case, four living children
who each took $2,500 legacies were, to that extent, preferred over the after-born
child who took nothing under the will and received a settlement similar to that
received by the living children; but, of course, this result did less harm to the
testamentary scheme than if the after-born child were allowed to take under
the statute.
96. Part II of this article will appear in the first issue of 7 BUFFALO L. REV.

